Breaking Down the Casbaneiro Infection Chain – Part II
Since 2018, the Casbaneiro banking trojan has targeted Latin American financial sectors. Sygnia monitors it closely as a major threat to multi-regional financial organizations.
Executive summary
- Last year, Sygnia published a blog post describing the Casbaneiro campaign infection chain, based on several investigations conducted by Sygnia’s incident response teams.
- In 2018, Casbaneiro banking Trojan (also known as Metamorfo, or Ponteiro) surfaced in mass malSpam campaigns targeting Latin America, and focusing on credential theft from financial websites.
- Based on Sygnia’s observations and recent investigations, the threat actors behind the Casbaneiro campaign have remained active over the past five years, introducing several changes to their attack chain, persistency techniques, and C2 infrastructure.
- A recent blog post from Talos provided a deep analysis of the tools used in the Casbaneiro campaign. Most of these tools and some of the infrastructure published by Talos were already described in Sygnia’s previous report, with the Talos post describing minor functionality changes.
- While the threat actors are still making effective use of spear phishing to initiate their infection chain, Sygnia also observed the use of a UAC bypass that enables the threat actors to execute code without triggering a UAC prompt.
- An analysis of samples related to this campaign that were uploaded to VirusTotal might indicate ongoing concentration in South and North America.
Attack chain updates
In previous Casbaneiro campaigns, the infection chain was initiated by a spear-phishing email containing a malicious PDF attachment that contained a download link to a zip file. In recent attacks observed by Sygnia, the infection chain was initiated by a spear-phishing email containing a malicious HTML attachment that redirects the target to download a RAR file, as illustrated in Figure 1:
Another major update in the threat actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is the use of a UAC bypass technique to execute code without a UAC prompt, by employing fodhelper.exe
Fodhelper is an executable used by Windows to manage features in its settings, and is often used by attackers to achieve a UAC bypass.
This attack is usually initiated by creating the following registry keys:
- HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command
- HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute
- HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)
Following the creation of the registry keys, the attacker populates a (default) sub-key with the command line.
Once fodhelper.exe is executed, either manually or by navigating to “Manage Optional Features” in Windows, it executes the command line with high integrity execution, thus bypassing the UAC prompt.
Casbaneiro attackers were also observed creating a mock folder on C:\Windows[space]\system32, and copying fodhelper.exe to that folder; however, the use of this path was not detected during Sygnia’s investigation. It is possible that the attacker deployed the mock folder to bypass antivirus detections, or to leverage the folder for side-loaded DLLs with Microsoft-signed binaries for the purposes of bypassing UAC.
C2 Infrastructure
The contactofiscal[.]cfd domain which is embedded in the HTML file (adjuntos_0102_.html) that was sent in the initial email was registered in mid-February 2023, and resolves to a Choopa ASN IP 45.32.90[.]70 which hosts hundreds of additional domains. Several additional domains were created and resolved to the same IP around that time, and are also embedded in HTML files with the same name; this led us to assume that those domains are also part of the current Casbaneiro campaign: factudigital[.]cfd, factdigital[.]shop, and cgdf[.]shop.
Furthermore, during our analysis, we discovered that over 40 files with the same unique HTML file name (adjuntos_0102_.html) were uploaded to VirusTotal since February 2023. All of the files were embedded with one of the four abovementioned domains, and two additional domains: serviciofac[.]shop and fiscalcgdf[.]shop.
The adjunto[.]shop domain also resolved to 45.32.90[.]70; based on its name, we assumed that this domain is also part of the current campaign. The tributaria[.]website domain which was used in later stages of the infection chain, was registered in July 2022 through Tucows Inc. The first resolution of this domain was recorded in mid-August to the IP 172.104.193[.]212, and at the end of November it resolved to the IP 139.177.193[.]74, which hosted it until mid-March 2023.
The Canadian Akamai IP 139.177.193[.]74 also resolved to the ckws[.]info and m9b4s2[.]site domains earlier this year. These domains were part of the malicious infrastructure that was reported by Sygnia in our previous Casbaneiro blog post – although they resolved to different IPs at the time. Additional domains hosted by the same IP which might also be part of recent campaigns include wiqp[.]xyz and live.xtream-ui[.]info.
Based on the information available in VirusTotal, over 20 malicious files communicating with the tributaria[.]website domain were uploaded since August 2022. Most of the files are obfuscated PowerShell scripts – like those described in Sygnia’s previous blog post – and some are CMD files.
Retro-hunt Analysis
Based on the samples collected during recent Casbaneiro investigations, Sygnia’s research team validated and updated three YARA rules that were published in the previous blog post (see Appendix for details). VirusTotal retro-hunt queries for these YARA rules one year back yielded the following results:
- Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script:
- A total of 86 samples were retrieved.
- Most of the samples were uploaded since the beginning of 2023 – approximately 70 samples.
- 58 samples were uploaded first from Mexico, others were first uploaded from Panama, Spain, Virgin Islands, India and the United States.
- Casbaneiro_Directory_Script:
- A total of 170 samples were retrieved.
- Most of the samples were uploaded since beginning of 2023 – approximately 150 samples.
- 120 samples were uploaded from the United States, 30 from Mexico, and some were first uploaded from Panama and Canada.
- Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL:
- A total of 16 samples were retrieved.
- All of the samples were uploaded since February 2023 from the United States.
All samples retrieved from the retro-hunt analysis are listed in the IOCs section below.
Conclusions
- The Casbaneiro banking Trojan was first identified in mass campaigns targeting financial sectors in Latin America in 2018.
- Based on Sygnia’s observations the threat actors behind the Casbaneiro campaign are still active to this day, with some changes over the years in their attack chain, C2 infrastructure, and TTPs.
- The threat actors are still making effective use of spear-phishing attack to initiate their infection chain, and still appear to be focused on Latin American targets.
- Sygnia continues to track Casbaneiro activity, as it poses a serious threat to multi-regional financial organizations.
To learn more about Sygnia’s Incident Response services click here.
If you are currently being impacted by a cyber incident, or are seeking guidance, please contact us or call our 24/7 hotline +1-877-686-86
Appendices
YARA Rules
Due to minor changes observed in recent Casbaneiro campaign, we have updated some of the YARA rules published in Sygnia’s previous blog post:
Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script – detects Casbaneiro dropper script.
This rule was adjusted by excluding specific C2 domains that were changed in recent attacks.
rule Casbanerio_Dropper_Script { meta: author = “Sygnia” copyright = “Sygnia” date = “21/03/2023” version = “2.0” description = “Detects Casbanerio Dropper Script.” tlp = “WHITE” strings: $s1 = “%SystemRoot%” wide ascii $v1 = “NN=http” $p1 = “IeX(New-oBJeCt Net.WebClIeNt).DOwnlOadStRING(‘%NN%’)” wide ascii $p2 = “Ie X (New-oBJ eCt N et.Web ClIeNt).DOwnlOa dStRIN G(‘%NN%’)” wide ascii$r1 = “%~f0” wide ascii condition: $s1 and (1 of ($d) and (1 of ($p) and $r1 and filesize < 1KB)) } |
Casbaneiro_Directory_Script – detects Casbaneiro directory script that creates a proprietary folder in the root directory of victim’s station (no changes were made).
rule Casbanerio_Directory_Script { meta: author = “Dan Saunders” copyright = “Sygnia” date = “22/02/2022” version = “1.0” description = “Detects Casbanerio Directory Script.” tlp = “WHITE” strings: $s1 = “%SystemRoot%” wide ascii $s2 = “Setlocal EnableExtensions” wide ascii $s3 = “Setlocal EnableDelayedExpansion” wide ascii $s4 = “set chars=0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz” wide ascii $s5 = “Set /P” wide ascii $s6 = “for /L %%N” wide ascii $s7 = “for /F %%C” wide ascii $s8 = “for /F %%F” wide ascii condition: all of ($s*) and filesize < 500 } |
Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL – detects decrypted Casbaneiro trojan DLL. This rule was adjusted by adding unique strings and exported function names.
rule Casbanerio_Trojan_DLL { meta: author = “Sygnia” copyright = “Sygnia” date = “22/03/2023” version = “2.0” description = “Detects Decrypted Casbanerio Trojan DLL.” tlp = “WHITE” strings: $s1 = “LI_ReportExceptionDescription” fullword ascii $s3 = “” fullword ascii $s4 = ” <requestedExecutionLevel” fullword ascii $s5 = ” processorArchitecture=\”\”/>” fullword ascii $s7 = “vafptuts” fullword ascii $s8 = ” publicKeyToken=\”6595b64144ccf1df\”” fullword ascii $s9 = “vgdkkbtw” fullword ascii $s10 = “wuvjoll” fullword ascii $s11 = “6%S%DET” fullword ascii $s14 = “DDDEYYZ” fullword ascii $s16 = “\\ -+G#” fullword ascii $s17 = “kUbiYT9” fullword ascii $s18 = “0 /AP@s” fullword ascii $s19 = “hnnFKK3″ fullword ascii $s20 = ” -|^~~” fullword ascii $f1 = “CmdToArgs” wide ascii $f2 = “JLI_GetStdArgc” wide ascii $f3 = “JLI_GetStdArgs” wide ascii $f4 = “JLI_Launch” wide ascii $f5 = “JLI_MemAlloc” wide ascii $f6 = “JLI_ReportErrorMessage” wide ascii $f7 = “TMethodImplementationIntercept” wide ascii condition: 8 of ($s) and 7 of ($f*) and filesize < 3MB } |
IOC(S) Indicators of Compromise
Domains and IPs:
IOC (Indicator of Compromise) | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
contactofiscal[.]cfd | Domain | C2 Domain |
tributaria[.]website | Domain | C2 Domain |
185.183.98[.]135 | IP | C2 IP Address |
216.238.82[.]27 | IP | C2 IP Address |
45.32.90.70 | IP | C2 IP Address |
139.177.193[.]74 | IP | C2 IP Address |
factudigital[.]cfd | Domain | Assumed to be related |
factdigital[.]shop | Domain | Assumed to be related |
cgdf[.]shop | Domain | Assumed to be related |
serviciofac[.]shop | Domain | Assumed to be related |
fiscalcgdf[.]shop | Domain | Assumed to be related |
wiqp[.]xyz | Domain | Assumed to be related |
live.xtream-ui[.]info | Domain | Assumed to be related |
Files collected during investigations:
File name | Value | Description |
---|---|---|
<COMPUTERNAME>.cmd | 750e41aad5833f4ceeb5742d8feb8d146ec12b6de78aaaeeb45f4d22e7a4d5e8 | Dropper |
<COMPUTERNAME>y.cmd | e67043faa4091ed18112c2f601fe83be82fcaf936a08ccea1b6beb4084e0fec1 | Dropper |
jli.dll | 6E18736CD63C60EC853B55E7BCF5C4540EE7290F | Casbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted |
_rfejwp6_K.ai | C5E6FFAE9A8EDC7FE4620A61D23F387B06EA63AE | AutoIt script encrypted |
_rfejwp6_K.exe | 2A4062E10A5DE813F5688221DBEB3F3FF33EB417 | Casbaneiro Banking Trojan executable |
_rfejwp6_K.ia | 60AF9D3490A563EC375866FAE5838BFEA0A9C09C | Casbaneiro payload encrypted |
_rfejwp6_K.ia.a1 | 62C493B9F5EC46004F7A5E56CE25B91313487A25 | Casbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted |
_rfejwp6_K.mdat.a1 | CC5F29915E6D0A3224B33BA5F7A5FA20B32685C9 | Casbaneiro Banking Trojan decrypted |
_rfejwp6_Ki7.exe | 615DC2FA827FAB39E16A7E9721F484E7F4D34F8E | Casbaneiro Banking Trojan executable |
PowerShell script (filename: 1) | a46b930daed233b8d929049ace13af189aaec88b | Stage 1 PowerShell Script |
yfmpx__4kUJyRp(7868).rar | D141B69CAD07D124707717686F5960186C2D974D | Stage 1 rar file |
HASHes of samples retrieved from YARA rules retro-hunt:
Casbaneiro_Trojan_DLL
c1902ea576bf0dd0e26d5c42902466d8bf643554c4218e94045394b00d642650 |
b9dc5b22a577bb990a062b8078b9a342ed2b4f5b2c2981b3f59f2fa118523418 |
bed60691140f5f41561048b4a83a6eeb87b26ae9a65c980ff8e6afe372a4f8a7 |
65c3d43f0f968dcf65ae44d2632d4bfc054afc64a020f2d2f6568af95c443d8f |
3cdfdc001bca62ec3ee2e651da89c2321e1b5c2ac5bfdbafdb728c6c3e402f08 |
29ebe7ccabe41ae84d571be063a8892fbafb9815f5addf86b10fae4942d779cd |
efef58d7abad4029fded1e9efcdb472ed1a5568eae1087e5fb4d036a45e8bd40 |
95c8b94859d0145f1873d4a34cee1db3d84ff631bd60fbde85dd08240902ac19 |
39194718b460ea174784f6a7edbccd1e3324fe1043be806927cece7a86f15611 |
217f234b5faa9f40a5e2522baa13d5125d9786ea14bee59c53053a2b8685b61e |
571ff0040c0b51e5887084dea0dc83d917e27591bdb471a16112001e0dcf1d84 |
9c3d6c38dc2b97a7b0b32dae1a31c5164d309c1f8caa9024d45390b81e8bf2b8 |
e7b17d3dc876ecdf05abb65a5b51ba77eb4c60fbb2996cd4e959fe33104c05fe |
6d31bcd121c14a1666d915d35e871445db1aecfd89202ced397f3fa4e7215955 |
8ef9fe3562d1ab97d219fd2b1ed66123b3bc9a8143adc181b5f4dcc62cec6a39 |
7c3a0f6c01229bc591d95253da6908206fe743cc217abd32873d4f4959b513d6 |
Casbaneiro_Dropper_Script
11f01a5357a0b388c5b783af95cff460619a02a8e0089702d24752f0cb9b2585 |
b8d2cbeb41d449b43103c7da0a8221dd350462c5ec5eb48f51deb5721f5280b0 |
cb3cb149657d21f71f4476c35f9ac8480a61fe3a4d54cabd4b66797334a15ca0 |
ed6f357cfe91cf9d3d7895c5b286992e6cfa7e508cbe346cf71a30ff5bee1815 |
947f08178dd04e36f1c0ec7223a931cfeb671e665433ef1a1c34b396def8c993 |
00d5e0da3e57afbb2bc9812435519ae6a74f2c49b9eab4347855f68c4da005b1 |
b7d036439300be2b1a78ef1fba1df0c3495c62d81e85a09fd83611ce0a52c0e6 |
b8de390cc2e66eca6f37da05b39bf1e69de6e2c78f14e317929cac9201ac5b86 |
fd6085a4f0fc7b9cd613eda999bdd7cb63fc1e6e36a640a6a8bfb2f4718ca963 |
bbd916dddd0f8849e6a860b4f7e9e8a3f342508b6d36525b783c7ef6a29cbe60 |
a967e3181984aabd705828f540935451fe7487f84711031d467d92ae48a47b09 |
f4aa142a2d45c62966a319ccdb37b30621a4ad22b4be82c0c1e67dedf56442d9 |
692a498dc935c3965171fda920728bec25039201e2cd734a2be8d0110fada35c |
3765b1a7901b40c84dc69bccf63641bddb6c2341ffc24caecf1dfec2aebe283b |
d05dbd52d14718db186b592a352d38394e17b49b4e03fe0cf7481fd10367a131 |
67b12f31fab1a66a398e4655fcff90e278805ad85c1516d222849ce8ea815519 |
965b0de04dc0e7305da99c656fa4c3a7ecfc93dde1975e283f3645dc13394512 |
33fb18a1eea637777911bb7f51ee439b98c696ecc25ce38e371e46edd1cc4ff1 |
43e4378549664935dced7b60f7dddeb37774b363a952c4402b12b877957a44c7 |
db50dc942b87d49a505c25841b88e71ec99c9e26727fcf348b3c2844d2737477 |
ab7e105943218ef48c00f9ee04b4b3cff79054f9a6591e6ed5b40c47d77c34ee |
5f76126a2acb908efbc950c12add52fe8ac9b872802176ff39551eec1a05fbe2 |
83d692c95335dd38486282c429b9744e1228ca7d24851ff9d601d494779c508b |
914d4f30f170f64b1e61e421061454f058f73c79b5f720850f6eb7c18166bdbc |
51a6225aa049b78c2ade7c7f94788fd3dfe115ccab962cd39936e01433d789a7 |
13e2c5b07b28bfea1a493dbdb755fc85b74064417b21c08526aa63c66aadcdca |
d0923cb0c89c117554b3eefd8efcd8d368d82e1d74834059cef363cbd669d2ec |
01422b80b6c3fd58caaed7fa03cf040a3836c1c5932b5bb23e95ff5aa7319667 |
0f5c356335909f05bfee17f75da47e9c0b2214b82d298bda0c4763ad2009a577 |
5edf716aab84a3434e79b67c829dc6ddffc19b9e5992f69be4b4150236fd4616 |
e53f15601c10ba98f8e667e4d97bd1eabbc8a1546e01f753255b6ef2b0df5428 |
30b43c9055a906957e0f986bce5509b4448006ef1ef873a8c4fc736c22244ffe |
da965b8d71587bb820873f1594976477fd4bc6b980f981f05585bf84048e2b88 |
5dc1a5fd7af11e7a4595c1140c7414cfe90a27c12915bce042bbd277b33c6863 |
cf2eaee4489e0ddcaa8b0e7250c807838c4695655d1ce52bbb5b462e5a4f688b |
ff440dfbbb8aeabd6d0c02a581299221ef038080f532d76cda3986af6ca1b97e |
f348e1b36f9c0d679524cf13ee47aa12a98db2a7333ea95b94129455c0730df2 |
f62875a957abf962a097c3288ba6cd69d599dff2efea7a7a30be25cb1d4d19aa |
5c770af12eb7d9909b949bcca56594734ac7afbce65471dae3f750b7f069a234 |
4a23b6b48afd468afaf633b3c16a9c4dffeffa2080e3e70decc6ff3490369c0a |
6cfdcb9e370d9c5e24b3c442e3a6d10e143e546371aca6585c55b83626edf88c |
80216218bf59331042d7ece32bda55cfb07b60885b5208e1f392842f486bbe19 |
a40e203cb9969cff95c007d4517b4f2c3323ee3717f6628af0110f2035bca1cd |
182be5deaf5782e73e3f03624e14d4cc300a33eba45dede18cf79b7f7ce50fd9 |
f0e25b939069e195e3f38157bda524fbece239758e66be871284e9d300db985b |
f6d3d7e59b0e860ca2448bbaa6d31d515b3ea7b9a492f851d425e9df75d52615 |
bb5a835f15f3b8d0064c4f9b222b40ace27b8a56730e718b45b0a5a7afbf7175 |
Casbaneiro_Directory_Script
cc3dc627a3a9be0c90c0cc49c63cac554aa5beb4b4eb2af7f252bc023bd65eea |
b0b7c57fa4eb66dcc30c5dd2b459155d69227bbe2e989d3fe99cd4ea15600d9b |
94a03c12ff5e4427182e81d3f0596b75e974cd30a6b85a3ab86b09c08bc28240 |
a2320ea11cbac9e87651c4afec29e9df4f6d4c9b1f1c7aae1d7f244dd7d923aa |
4723e36ab1dabf48f44898895848c86157f215bf6c21ce40373b09ec3c15d70a |
04736c07b767bb780c01f2bae422c9174101b0c2e57948cd1c5ca744e5a3124f |
7bb65622a41630d423382adf9cff706dccf23791be6235cff3fd5974de5ae831 |
92a9c8d3050a4c6020f651530e995fdabe2898f37a42d9612b1b4d720854a11d |
bd030f863ab39de4bccb702778cbaabba8fd50c9cbf9261f3d7cc072cb48666c |
761dc188fd9d761a01403c59434133d5a58a08c6a8ddfe6196edc08d4d00e9c1 |
3ba9a15929b3a0aa165352a068cbc4f0dd205a2d779e808ccfc72e7eede1f2a0 |
35bbb3a6c7510e6f518036f3ff0f09ef51c6a0add0ba14d9ae0925f5ea9337be |
d2b422e2e177d6f33a684e18b3ec59c23173fd7fecbf7a0569df1efe20a8b3b6 |
b40032379af79ee32cfe7aeb8e239a864a7a8cc3d932db53de806858e57a860a |
cf4f9f3e17aa74d3818977c2bd0a9d1f530b51f58e5389d49a32d66794a3924b |
b6306f004af6a831ec5f878acb93d5167878e39e0a90b75d377bcdbed340d60f |
236155ca53e8afda04e04181f57fc89cdc5a702ff44a2e22782c68503ccdc7b3 |
fe796047548af3aa72f7250354eb7d8f80dba768047f46dae8ee115404eb04c4 |
d3a2653f7d49178bc14a6d838af864501d9a6e9962c2210f810b03a5131bcdc8 |
fa82be4605c59dafb8fd7b006aa125b174ec46f6ace06bb6b25583e1aac20dd0 |
f68b47b80aa9b70f47a459d33d1a7745fe5b2c3658050aa5ba7d4dabf6ac42fe |
7e21500d4d39b725cdf52013fd7d1efc873c41cbf36f4d55ee7d1ae804e3274a |
de43853bfb670a457df4844936c0b984507723089a39c17d5bb5d66bfe24c6ca |
6f89360690991707ae035eb30221ea1c319673a78125d0caf03b56641b543fcf |
9be8fe0915f4e991560aaf14b3b809257e86a3554664a18812bcad3bff65bc17 |
9b96b4f0c25b7e80883d57e1245880a2fb63024ceedb36809292c840590206e0 |
7a2d37bd3fdc3e36cac939262435339e0a887a0dcdf49f78ae8a05d6d43a838b |
c91aeb5024a150db97f2d83f0207e9a960c51bba615c0e82d71ec6b9b59c849c |
5d9d89a7f224a7b5c18785f9b72969d8079f63cb7f4ee8137d3699632e39aa90 |
e819d1f87027069a920bb2373ac20b392ed47eeb1d4d55220147e8a7b4d40a90 |
9616137243c827a1cf2d73d9296033e2b504ee154d5204d102b08e08ade1b9de |
e5948aa8c61cdc585f9b33654bb502f1fb991a23cce45169ddc0db76318c2923 |
c42afd24bec1873eb5c674cfb5791576032715cee642712f6ab2fb1bc4543a8e |
5866fec6080ada776b1c17aa22c4525d678fc091ab21179ede79a0a994885f1c |
30bd9b42d7357ff24dc64543d286441ca15f9869a2e2307124de0c49c6c2613a |
e31a061e1e7a36d4a1cad4c8eb058ea469ba5163e00a10249259c0ad733cef17 |
21983983af5e1a3915fa1659dc1d3db2a1830e6c2e723c47365f8dd4c112277e |
502e0b155e91c1a7b5580d9171ac02ec1ebc58e8b07979fa0b297996e5da210b |
2b67769c29ef7d90fc16e3138aad99f1428027589e2c676e55c6024939830453 |
71caee789ccb097d71bc650b7ddc01df9399ee0fe528487b9a4604b538e17f2c |
489a5d3fff408a7adba3bc689c7a69a240694e65c97756a450307244e8197db8 |
9cbc6c1415c1643e9dedefe2b99fcc5f5c5e626899b9b88f469fd7df9ffd1b49 |
2cf9b85fca1469f801033952ecc6082e4eb7a7e9944a9893b79e758c57214313 |
eee919352e49e165d6c281bc29a8f50fbefd1f4ddd6dc866648ac9f1f7193828 |
9fec5be2103ebcb7a2c0306a43fbece75ae1cf2c8074913606e13f64d8be59ce |
f655a95ccdb0b8c9adcf1f2e1e0887ff506d4022b9cd7c2b3b3058ff38904c67 |
9d0551707c87a1079f962334a90a79fd747302bb4ff15aae9502d58540e07230 |
132e5442a2ddfc1439956c9f9c86bf201c180cefad59a003ad1709aa98d84fe6 |
9bd634dc3b7531e914aa36426d67b69b09d0a8a62c8dddd916d8503934d7f23f |
ea3604a1e2dc34e87b4d3c338fa631f3ea8bb6d61ff2bb754985b6a399594661 |
cef0fa4ffd2a4750525abff9a5d3d77c343eaf20df39aa96a10246c77b968013 |
868f99f1bcd144afa8d302690c2a77dc280cc0aa2bc80bc5742a470328cc987d |
0d9da2f3d007a4368ff82a166aac77264d85a9989ae93b644bf5d4535ef23d1e |
44c1635b7f6573f7bce52a9fe0c430bf534a4b3ed344b7c7e5d749e92ca92cf1 |
3c14105a215a1f55489fb31505cb904aa6f6d0c153b58637a12f12df64fb4543 |
e597b4e40fb47f13fd004f9794b79d70d8a53a663a671ac5ef9dda9ee1b5ccdc |
4ea64156be129a289087e392ef3bf561fc7d6aa1321c073e59efa7cbc57751da |
cce27ecfb2e590322b098568ea846263696aa7eaa268c9f3e109ee202e0e8ff7 |
c28fe222150f1063a63c54b9ee642e448a2c7e7f4ab76bb770de1a9ee7082e40 |
4024824acb6751e345e5937fcad52a37952ce811efeeccbb5ca271fbdc029d95 |
137d12f7f8fd07b3bd2640417db8d57d787478e1d07696fe34420a33108c53a2 |
46a2d7e3d420966791b5f9f5323e27181d03a4b011dc2cf0f64b66fea6fcaf47 |
26975f0893c0ea65748b0a5c67c56ddef3c853190b10fd0fe0f173ed7e613fa8 |
34696299d98ca01c41f6e0158ec0620282877eae4ef39695baf20694d5f173b1 |
2ab7cbdf29058f0e0f30200c23b39989dc16144d778e843bc1e19b540b4e68a9 |
ac72d3831fabddc0c3e240ac4fa477823ed56fc63fedf1831a9a4cc6abfb062f |
1c9ef52271c1e16cd65f06961fc0b603beacf0ad7d0167a530b348e67830a888 |
d0ddf3ec1dff97912976d5e1747c90c5567c47350eaee7009f2285cd33e9eee8 |
9840ed043fa897970899ea4de352ebd1581c23288f358a55d1d72d91fbb07f39 |
ecb1a0ff06a49394544f3018cdb66b4e170c4ae6fb288cb0559dfe2388106eeb |
f8c30a42ea4ce894a8c3da414aa6eae01d559062504f087924e5bc810315d7d6 |
544068651e45d10785c9be8f1e4a18fdf5dcad6c3faba42a0956ccc5926057a0 |
349aed1d23d789587b38c66026f61966c48470cfa93724123b5cd101611a8b79 |
425180e3f04990f5f286a77f247f9c80b59d212b638a3a54c56de9565c608e82 |
4e1925f0ca68a56964235612b7940a64ed518b7532bcc28cc99c023e0425a0aa |
16a955d7d7e246724e96b58ecde1515e8831fea290d1836b7aec8dc1b0d4fbde |
4c42b69f9518f6fb523b35893e8da99337c11f0aab5d6b399f9675587aaf1ed2 |
68eb62f064112f4d72e93918a30c5ff86ad28dd95e52d498dc91a0a1dd5d4839 |
0775dc738e65fb6289175183099611a6de4e8334bbbfe8f4fd2835b87b632402 |
4ffd56151f34fa6a6817003b7b4d3758307449c965b45b277c723eb93bd01c39 |
4c6b9afba4deefe844ac49c73e29a2732488e654a0fc9255db480eb0eb28c590 |
ef8fb90a608370d41317cbff6a2fb2938f23d7952fdce7be6e36dc261dc82c7a |
4b0a1952811894a67178db48e6617ec5528c236444884abf4f4f8b8fe2e014e9 |
38879044af231b5b38d508d177b2974381f87f120c14121166bcaf1aec092480 |
0610f151dfc45503f84363e443e211ad1187d8f42065cdb1bd7bb8a64fc44011 |
97a3e9c92f38f2d6114bd901f74307a0cc2e6708adbaaa6c8fa7adb61ee814d3 |
6b60b0f0ffc6a8983215ebfd575058bbdeeee8b364416e0f7e2de461af8bd3f7 |
442d28a4662139a7f396b96790200bdd6877d52536ab3a3014c4e7432ba89a39 |
84416f491e74c1e3167e8c7bc9b4cdd93c793652032ab1bad9a599b6d1e3e228 |
7c82ba1c68e2007a1b0d6ab1011c62261af9dabe03cc4c007602ce500b3fbbc2 |
7802f680b075bf9f111f227847f28dba882891a06bbdc601ef37b478823e9303 |
f57d1a313084f1b28d45f996fffb69eaaec7e3da425ed90ff00d485e09175675 |
775b4e0599241dc7698de6896c5088705e4d38ce7b037cb01703a5e52e286b44 |
6d821b08f5bea0ccaaedf48dd004376852be11d560d893fe33f7f5f8ce123146 |
eb690c83b700e68474ccb274a74701baed1acc8dc48e55f4abfe99753b28ea41 |
84311ab4e5c7fa27ea9567261a72c30d12a4100d4e6b2d9d6b95aae5bfd801d9 |
a95f0915f8ff5a7b3aac5539ffe916739e8f887ee4f50e16430a4c56c647dabf |
1d2fa0eaf2b6a6fca89704df40a70e9767ffe6d2539e4cdc0612ba8e4a66d751 |
c2480b67bc4cffdfd597cf5f0257acc312607f1c338b5ced1c941dc816c73eb6 |
46fb4204b4c3b584e966a66fc053e06cc470ec4b67ff96b9b8127b81acc0c7f2 |
e136674e057e6c2f5e9ac3be515922946c3ab1326f4e7bf4cbc1fb5d1f8a11ab |
434ff54507cd1285e17aa78fb1e7ef46963b66d71aee47835154aeadc74889f4 |
3925552b848f321e5c85d84cfe66ddd7a9eb3693a2704f1871f732f389a1fea9 |
30a9703b92a528c357a3e8f4144a93a9e8ddd246a82875283df8c9ba4d9fd349 |
ae6b3ac5cb27a068a28caf901401df64e24b411c47339a786418758a84f53069 |
4137e675014b0ef0975480c46879c9da5eed705d36a71f97664aac5bf383bef4 |
1d2746bda0892153c9cd5e3e8cf5ba3e911b3c6ca70f371486f6bd9262e74108 |
1adeb65277518275e049282c981faf5ed684877aa476baf07b5b82a806e29ed8 |
9152f1df74c2e2237f4b348cf83bd9f0c880140a0d18e0f3d270fd03f5dd7b0c |
0ffbb9bcbda44122c64dad324b8f3823fd60a556a63a2a42f686787069756cda |
d4eb079659b0b247424da03d9d0ad0eb670d84d9ddf360a1b866ca8564ae87fd |
850cb53cb3ea0299cea757234265fc3adbf7c6e464e7995b66f27bd1218bf409 |
f9a5f5b3797b3bfdd27cbadf6e0f50327fc70b1cc47b75c55ccc1389b2610502 |
0dea1725a9b72a3214b946a8755d83f9256ddf1cec05a540255357259324a390 |
8288598c3caafc3ea95e2742209d03f6472ef71350e61891c17fe70d4c1c211e |
a1de65ba82c6256b10858be700ea60d5334fd7f6647583f7c6dbef04a9d7489f |
f3f75bb5c96c01436d66ca0d82092855b4ba9e7a4e24186475047c75a066b85a |
42c11aa10873029f2e777350a5f965b984e277d99c3aa3e5779daccf4776ed9d |
50b79051c2a94506255e598bd5db7a1ec1525c48ce243e61f84d8a8ea3f7b7b7 |
9274b4aaf62104026baa695e285b0883bb445dffe4a7cdb1f592f85fc2096183 |
0ec4d3d8ebd506b7fceb8e16f3910b545aff127db9ce6a230fa3b337173e020a |
7355e00844e0cb7edc31933151873fee456521c5a16f0ab4644f99fbb4bb9a92 |
edbd849ccfc876dc4831718206ab14625debe07a27449fc20506dbf8b1d4f877 |
2c9c7c442fc314cf2215c2367b9407195dcb5d62c133cfcca66256ac8f9c779c |
1de425cf303205b49b79189925ed4bd8a0cea94c9fdbeaf6698ab52c47461d35 |
0093cce0fa9a52d6ecde470a19f5d3f91d15a93013ed4179a3a39df5a024e45e |
fd8b025b1e9e7a1ad38d74c15c7aeeab2445596ae7a47b12cdb3988dc43a1676 |
0d5ec1aa0f3989aabd8dee83b6290c6d570a98f7b124c3cb0d54488a9e70bf70 |
1d02017bfe23da76e2396d33a37ac28ad77b9cd357508777f6c28400505d7eaa |
369a6ea6b33a8f2a6ace9a060ed8cad3e9abb935b31cf0fd0db7f1f31c55c909 |
24beb0f91992ed857b814bf466aa44bbea5354a1410b9750a243f1fd709c202d |
8b47d734a82ad4a3742a81e7e68d5e8cf90a6f6d41fa87fc10609951957e6940 |
36e47266347336338ce36d653168485f6d06b8bbcf601d4fd8c05fcb6276eefb |
a2f47cdac813535fc68f86d9a89f78d75e8d382dc30a0e73cd640fac27048dc0 |
884e597d265aedc58e2551e36b669835adb57ca1463e87a73c27742111b907b4 |
a53b87210d1439220442375569e527b6b0709481f2a0a0ba3509a6bf1aab625a |
230b72cf8d87fbc84eb7cdf703033d1271703f35dc6ddd22d00211f996c35a75 |
069f49425c8705b27cf4dbc68d574461ab934e8cdaf0b3a7cd0aed38e6b01303 |
efe9d0bd30f865ac896bbb8174c679246afed339a81a787fbe3a2d6426667ce3 |
5661e7815e62ba78de6738c1b4b79b6edb9b07eddc64604ced96dae633258bd8 |
f7f6413d17c431ff97bd905be0465a91971f2fc1aa3a838939ac4b5b0df154dd |
18cbf55d11b6bd092def3b82dcb2b767a16338204cdb8cfda284f65866ada347 |
36690591b58f66e1bb9f0694c708b70c2dad7a32e676768908f7e2a67e612aa8 |
db5e1fbd256786afa9ce03e98cacf137cff43f27b388ec0881928df1a97af050 |
e06e49aae02c014f1fb14aecf0d638a5c70c73a47a2109403cb8b7ce486526b1 |
11e7a8eb1e5e57a242f1c4a0950ad94fe356838a8c5b02567ddebdc2071b327d |
7ade9492117352ebd89b9599d6c0c05eeb6205c40bf0d8c916a455f9c9c58f20 |
ad00798e0ad77199ce218de0b0f3a8c5c32bea8324341e02f607bdbaa24f9520 |
83d0c84b1ac57380bc6992f3a5687a9c688ef423b411b122e3561e026342d596 |
58643428428801029d43e429ee1f9754066d275b14fa7e8144f2b52bc8db3c5a |
4e8b8ab73d2ef4060146268b69e192a735b89f5a58d593ab00ebdfe656205384 |
3c446e5cdc68adc5b07d48b3f449ea44feb37490a68139c9d92aea4a1f33777c |
816a100e89c3a948bdafcf2ea3b7b8d5e839d54a5adf06c594dbe803fa431f36 |
2f52b7450f0bb16607878e79758479273766b52db146a38e5f800d88a6157d2a |
b7dc343b87dff3fc016811ff8be5156a3576b47b50247ffe5b3173f525543556 |
441992a0e3d0d0760fe9b0268c079d8bab84ae1310863e92e8983cb1861fb90c |
858345b5ab03236a9e738d5a5dabd13a208927229aeb97879ab319f023e0d454 |
9e4290a850ab68b1036851556a7bd53f8e5855d2aea3dd47d6d28c6dc05d4adb |
91b78766844f0771dfad52819e991065c1a248245df0b20c75cdf69ca9cf31be |
e42f81262acfdb9a84505deb422a6a7aa799ac017a6619b64bb17a59cf031f85 |
b8c9a7353f463e93b30d3f5c55628c182580cd982a1901734d8e4ce3c5bcdfd3 |
89123cd09aa8f99b189da32e3a11268934b95686708a4f74447cb3aaec56892f |
43693c3d9a5e83df26d4b4a2baffba5c3ca6c472d5dbc6545b7e299b0e103ff7 |
be6541dfa193bb7ce04c323da76d7bf52e3ecb3c8e099d3adb9bbeeee119534d |
9245d75a27ca65985cdeb27a122ee4989e4e0c9a020bb41f865dfec512b9d81d |
bdc0c2040212acde13429e2d329949abe4f2edea24ef9e765616f8b2821e2d76 |
090e3a1be2b3124e46b65d2593c08d0b45a6660c7f809b238f41aded734d335d |
c77016e4f94ae81f5a3cc702b46e32f029d5ffe36a7a10eab7356868ec516085 |
d997db37507103e19aa2efc0d28c5bbb46ab825828ae756b15b5d39a9adae2f2 |
c663f0715d083a76d5a13a71e90d3e42a60981055bef4b97da84b1d041f334f5 |
If you are currently impacted by a cyber incident, or are seeking guidance, please contact us or call our 24/7 hotline +1-877-686-86
This blog post and any information or recommendation contained herein has been prepared for general informational purposes and is not intended to be used as a substitute for professional consultation on facts and circumstances specific to any entity. While we have made attempts to ensure the information contained herein has been obtained from reliable sources and to perform rigorous analysis, this advisory is based on initial rapid study, and needs to be treated accordingly. Sygnia is not responsible for any errors or omissions, or for the results obtained from the use of this blog post. This blog post is provided on an as-is basis, and without warranties of any kind.
By clicking Subscribe, I agree to the use of my personal data in accordance with Sygnia Privacy Policy. Sygnia will not sell, trade, lease, or rent your personal data to third parties.